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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has a problem with gangs. According to the
Department of Justice, there are more than twenty thousand gangs 1
in the United States today, with over one million members. 2 There are
gangs in every state and in the District of Columbia. 3 This is a dire
problem in the eyes of federal government officials. According to
Attorney General Michael Mukasey, "Gangs threaten our society ....
They bring a culture of violence and drugs to our doorsteps, creating
an atmosphere of fear, diminishing the quality of life, and
endangering the safety, well-being, and future of our children." 4 In
response, the federal government is becoming increasingly involved in
5
investigating, prosecuting, and imprisoning gang members.
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO") 6 is central to this initiative. 7 RICO enables aggressive federal
prosecution of criminal activities committed in connection with illicit
organizations, or "enterprises."8 Because modern gangs often display
the level of cohesion and organization required to qualify as
"enterprises" under the law, RICO seems an apt prosecutorial device. 9
Furthermore, the statute's stiff sentences, 10 accompanied by the

1.
While there is no universally accepted definition of "gang," the National Alliance of
Gang Investigators Associations ("NAGIA") recommended a useful definition in its 2005 Gang
Threat Assessment: "A group or association of three or more persons who may have a common
identifying sign, symbol, or name and who individually or collectively engage in, or have engaged
in, criminal activity .... " NAT'L ALLIANCE OF GANG INVESTIGATORS ASS'NS, 2005 GANG THREAT
ASSESSMENT 54 (2005), available at http://www.nagia.org/PDFs/2005_national_gang-threat_
assessment.pdf.
2.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE GROWTH OF
VIOLENT STREET GANGS IN SUBURBAN AREAS (2008) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT],
availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs27/27612/index.htm#Contents.
3.
Id.
Id.
4.
5.
See infra Part II (detailing the federal government's efforts to curb gang violence).
6.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2000).
7.
See infra Part II (describing the federal government's liberal use of the RICO statute in
prosecuting gang members).
Id.
8.
9. See infra note 58 and accompanying text (cataloging federal court decisions that have held
that street gangs can be enterprises for the purposes of RICO).
10. JED. S. RAKOFF & HOWARD W. GOLDSTEIN, RICO: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW AND
STRATEGY § 1.08 (2008); Frank D'Angelo, Note, Turf Wars: Street Gangs and the Other Limits of

RICO's "Affecting Commerce" Requirement, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 2083-84 (2008). I would
be remiss if I did not acknowledge Mr. D'Angelo's excellent Note on this subject, which was
published after the instant Note was accepted for publication. While Mr. D'Angelo and I agree on
much in this area, our pieces are sufficiently different in kind as to avoid redundancy.
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unavailability of parole,1 ' give the prosecutions teeth, while federal
resources help augment overwhelmed state systems. 12
This initiative entails an aggressive expansion of federal power
that is constitutionally questionable at its outer bounds. Specifically,
it is constitutionally problematic for the government to prosecute
noneconomic street gangs for violent intrastate activities. A
noneconomic street gang is a gang that (1) does not engage in
economic activity, such as dealing drugs or providing prostitution or
gambling, and (2) operates in neighborhoods, as opposed to in prisons
or on motorcycles. 13 In the last four years, federal courts of appeals
have scrutinized at least two RICO prosecutions against gangs of this
sort for violent intrastate activity, and those courts reached divergent
opinions about the constitutionality of such prosecutions. 14 This Note
argues that such prosecutions are constitutional only when the gangs
have had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 15
The Note proceeds as follows. Part II describes RICO's origin
and the federal government's increasing use of the statute to combat
gangs nationwide. Then, it describes the statutory elements that
RICO prosecutions must satisfy: (1) that an enterprise existed, (2) that
the enterprise engaged in or affected interstate commerce, (3) that the
defendant was employed by or associated with the enterprise, and (4)
that the defendant participated in the enterprise's conduct through (5)
a pattern of racketeering activity.' 6 Part II also briefly explores
Commerce Clause doctrine and its evolution into a controversial basis
for regulating intrastate criminal activity, as illuminated by the

11.

3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, NANCY J. KING & SUSAN R. KLEIN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 536 (3d ed. 2004).
12. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
13. Waucaush v. United States, 380 F.3d 251, 255-56 (6th Cir. 2004); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
REPORT, supra note 2.
14. United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 40-43 (1st Cir. 2007); Waucaush, 380 F.3d at
258; see infra Part III.
15. The term "noneconomic" arguably prejudges the commerce question. It is not intended
to do so. Both the First and Sixth Circuits used this term to describe the subject gangs during
their Commerce Clause analyses. Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 30 passim; Waucaush, 380 F.3d at 258
passim. The term denotes that the gang does not engage in economic activity, such as dealing
drugs or organizing gambling. Waucaush, 380 F.3d at 256. This does not preclude the possibility
that a "noneconomic street gang" may affect interstate commerce in such a way as to bring it
within Congress' commerce power.
16. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (outlining the components of a RICO
prosecution).
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modern trilogy of United States v. Lopez, 17 United States v. Morrison,1 8
and Gonzales v. Raich.19
Part III examines conflicting decisions from the First and Sixth
Circuits regarding the constitutionality of federal RICO prosecutions
of noneconomic street gangs accused of intrastate violence. 20 In
Waucaush v. United States, the Sixth Circuit held that a member of a
noneconomic street gang could not be convicted under RICO unless
the gang substantially affected interstate commerce. 21 In United
States v. Nascimento, the First Circuit held that gangs need only have
a de minimis effect on interstate commerce to be properly subjected to
22
prosecutions of this sort.
Part IV analyzes the constitutionality of these prosecutions as
illuminated by Supreme Court precedent and the circuit split, and it
argues that noneconomic street gangs must have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce for these prosecutions to be constitutional.
Under Lopez and Morrison, regulation of noneconomic intrastate
violence is beyond the power of the federal government. 23 And while
the Raich Court referred to classes of activity-instead of particular
instances of activity-for the purposes of Commerce Clause analyses,
noneconomic intrastate gang violence is not in the same class as the
activity that RICO legitimately covers. 24 Furthermore, Raich may be
distinguishable because it involved regulation of a fungible
commodity. 25 Finally, allowing federal regulation of noneconomic
intrastate gang violence impermissibly alters the delicate balance of
power between federal and state governments. 26 Part V concludes.

II. RICO AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The federal government's authority to bring prosecutions under
RICO is predicated on the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. In order to inquire into the constitutionality of these
prosecutions, it is useful to examine the origin and elements of the

17. 514 U.S. 549, 563-64 (1995).
18. 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000).
19. 545 U.S. 1, 32-33 (2005).
20. The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Waucaush predated the Supreme Court's 2005 ruling in
Raich. But, contrary to the First Circuit, this Note argues that Raich does not close the question.
21. Waucaush v. United States, 380 F.3d 251, 255-56 (6th Cir. 2004).
22. United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 37 (1st Cir. 2007).
23. See infra Part IV.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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statute as well as the Commerce Clause doctrine that frames its
proper limits.
A. RICO
From its origin as a weapon designed to destroy the Mafia to its
utility as a device for dismantling modern gangs, the RICO statute
has proven to be a potent and adaptable law. The federal
government's escalating application of the law to gangs, however,
invites renewed scrutiny as to its proper use. This Section describes
the origins of the RICO statute, the rising trend of RICO prosecutions
of gangs, and the elements that the government must establish to
obtain convictions.
1. RICO's Origin
Congress passed RICO in 1970 for the purpose of dismantling
organized crime.2 7 The law announces that "[ilt is the purpose of this
Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States...
by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies ....,,28 As the
Supreme Court stated in 1983, "the RICO statute was intended to
provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon
29
organized crime and its economic roots."
The Mafia was the particular species of organized crime with
which Congress was concerned when it passed RICO. 30 And the
statute proved remarkably effective at disrupting notorious crime
families. 31 By 1989, a bombardment of RICO prosecutions had
resulted in convictions of organized crime figures in New York, Los
32
Angeles, Cleveland, Kansas City, Philadelphia, Boston, and Newark.
Several of the defendants received sentences of one hundred years or
more.33 A 1992 Newsweek article noted that, "due to successful RICO
prosecutions, one of New York's five Mafia families is severely

27. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26-27 (1983).
28. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2000)).
29. Russello, 464 U.S. at 26.
30. Lesley Suzanne Bonney, Comment, The Prosecution of Sophisticated Urban Street
Gangs: A ProperApplication of RICO, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 579, 580 (1993) (citing S. REP. No. 91617, at 36-43 (1969)).
31. Id. at 597 (citing Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Current RICO Policies of the Department of
Justice, 43 VAND. L. REV. 651, 653 (1990); Rod Nordland, The "Velcro Don" Wiseguys Finish
Last, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 13, 1992, at 34).
32. Dennis, supra note 31, at 653.
33. Id.
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crippled; the leaders of the other four families are in jail or awaiting
trial; and none of the nation's twenty-four Mafia families have escaped
prosecution in recent years." 34 Emboldened by this success, the federal
government identified a new public enemy against which to turn this
powerful tool-the modern gang.
2. Applying RICO to Gangs: A Developing Trend
The United States Department of Justice is currently engaged
in a campaign to eradicate American gang activity, notwithstanding
the fact that states have traditionally played the lead role in
combating localized crime. According to the Department of Justice's
Criminal Resource Manual, "the heinous and uncontrollable nature" of
gang activity has led to "an increasing federal effort to assist local law
enforcement in targeting and federally prosecuting violent
criminals." 35 The Manual argues that "[flederal assistance in
prosecuting traditionally state-prosecuted crimes" is essential to
curbing gang violence. 36 "Federal assistance" entails, among other
things, federal resources, federal statutes, and federal prison
37
sentences.
The RICO statute is central to the federal government's
increased involvement. According to former Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales, "This use of federal RICO laws is an innovative approach to
fighting criminals with tough penalties that may be unavailable in the
state system."3 8 The RICO statute lends itself to the task of combating
gangs by virtue of its stiff sentences and the unavailability of parole in
the federal system.3 9 Also, federal intervention may be attractive in
this area due to the relative bounty of resources in the federal system
compared to that of state systems. In addition to federal prosecutors,
federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement may add expertise and
funding.

34. Bonney, supranote 30, at 580 n.7 (citing Nordland, supranote 31, at 34).
35. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, tit. 9, § 106, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
usao/eousa/foia-reading-roomusam/title9/crmOO106.htm.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Delivers Remarks at the Noble Training
Conference, FDCH CAPITAL TRANSCRIPTS, 2007 WLNR 14758164, July 30, 2007.
39. See supra notes 10-11 (detailing the exceptionally harsh penalties resulting from a
RICO conviction).
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Between 2000 and 2007, federal prosecutors brought at least
thirty RICO cases against alleged gang members. 40 These prosecutions
occurred and are occurring in widely diverse locales throughout the
country. For example, United States attorneys obtained RICO
indictments against members of "Nuestra Familia" in San Francisco
in June of 2001, the "King Mafia Associates" in Salt Lake City in May
2002, the "Boot Camp Gang" in Syracuse in June 2003, the "Hoover
Crips" in Tulsa in June 2005, and the "Crips" in Wichita in September
2007.41

This is an escalating trend. While aggregate statistics are not
available regarding the frequency with which the Justice Department
brings RICO charges 42-let alone RICO charges against gangs in
particular-it is possible to discern a trend by resorting to print news
coverage. A Westlaw search designed to identify articles regarding
RICO prosecutions of gangs yielded six articles from 1986, thirty
articles from 2001, ninety-nine articles from 2006, and 160 articles
from 2007. 43 According to a similar search, news coverage of gang
prosecutions in general, without regard to RICO, also increased
during this time period, but at a lower rate than those stories
44
involving RICO.
In addition to the executive branch, Congress has taken an
interest in using RICO to quell gang activity. For instance, between
1997 and 2007, at least seven bills were introduced in the Senate
containing the terms "RICO" and "gangs."45 Also, in 2007,
Representative Tom Davis, ranking member of the House Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform, requested that the
Government Accounting Office undertake a study of the effectiveness

40. See infra Figure 1 (cataloging prosecutions of gangs under RICO since 2000).
41. Id. The novelty of this approach is illuminated by the fact that the case in Wichita
marked the first time a defendant had ever been charged under RICO in Kansas. Tim Potter,
Accused Man is Denied Release, WICHITA EAGLE (Kan.), Oct. 11, 2007, at Al.
42. The Organized Crime Division of the Department of Justice informed the author, via
telephonic inquiry, that such statistics were not available to the public.
43. The search term parameters were: da(yyyy) & (RICO & gang Is prosecut! or charg!) %
puerto. The term RICO is sufficiently unique that this search should only uncover stories
involving the RICO statute. In addition, some stories covering RICO prosecutions may not
mention the statute by its formal name, instead relying on informal terminology. Thus, I believe
this research strategy is quite conservative, leading to false negatives but few false positives.
44. The search parameters were: da(yyyy) & gang/s prosecut! or charg!.
45. Fighting Gangs and Empowering Youth Act of 2007, S. 990, 110th Cong. (2007);
Fighting Gangs and Empowering Youth Act of 2006, S. 4028, 109th Cong. (2006); Gang
Prevention and Effective Deterrence Act of 2005, S. 155, 109th Cong. (2005); Gang Prevention
and Effective Deterrence Act of 2003, S. 1735, 108th Cong. (2003); Criminal Gang Abatement Act
of 2001, S. 1236, 107th Cong. (2001); Youth Gun Crime Enforcement Act of 1999, S. 995, 106th
Cong. (1999); Anti-Gang and Youth Violence Act of 1997, S. 362, 105th Cong. (1997).

218

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1:211

of RICO prosecutions against gangs to determine whether there may
46
be ways to alter the law to make it more efficacious.
Although federal RICO prosecutions of gangs are increasing,
not everyone sees this as a positive development. Critics are concerned
that the threat of long federal sentences may lead to coerced guilty
47
pleas, false confessions, and unreliable incrimination of third parties.
Some commentators have also expressed concern about the
inequitable impact of these prosecutions across races. According to one
public defender, these prosecutions can be "perceived as heavy-handed
use of force against the poorest in our community," such as AfricanAmericans and Hispanics. 48 Indeed, during protests of the "Jena 6"
incident, at least one speaker referenced RICO prosecutions as an
49
instrument of government persecution of African-Americans.
Critics also argue that these prosecutions are doing violence to
traditional notions of federalism. As one Boston defense attorney
argues, there is a " 'real risk' of federalizing all sorts of violent
criminal activity that has traditionally been prosecuted by the states
and, under the U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause, has to be
prosecuted by the states."50 Moreover, it seems Congress is aware of, if
not daunted by, the prospect of encroaching on states' domain.
According to one Senate aide, in considering a 2004 anti-gang bill,
" 'The big question was whether the federal government should be
federalizing normal street crimes.' "51
3. RICO's Elements
Notwithstanding compelling policy arguments for and against
RICO prosecutions of gangs, it is an examination of the elements of
the crime that ultimately allows one to determine the prosecutions'

46. Rep. Davis Requests Study of Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations, Task
Forces in Gang Prosecutions, U.S. FED. NEWS, 2007 WLNR 10593116, June 6, 2007.
47. Natalie Neysa Alund, Racketeering Laws Hit Local Gangs, BRADENTON HERALD (Fla.),
Nov. 4, 2007, at 1 (quoting defense attorney Brett McIntosh).
48. Julie Kay, Acosta Launches Federal Fight Against Gangs, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV.
(Fla.), Apr. 16, 2007, at 1.
49. Maureen Sieh Urban, Rallies Support "Jena6", Speakers Use Opportunity to Reflect on
Black Community, POST STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Sept. 21, 2007, at Bi.
50. Eric T. Berkman, RICO Covers Violent, Noneconomic Activity, Rules 1st Circuit, MASS.
LAW. WKLY., July 16, 2007.
51. Beth Barrett, Federal Anti-Gang Drive Resumes: L.A. Killers Worse than Mafia,
Feinstein Says, DAILY NEWS (L.A.), Dec. 30, 2004, at N1.
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propriety. The substantive RICO criminal statute is codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c). 52 It provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct
affairs through a
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
53
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.

Accordingly, in order to convict a defendant under RICO, the
prosecution must prove that: (1) an enterprise existed, (2) the
enterprise engaged in or affected interstate commerce, (3) the
defendant was employed by or associated with the enterprise, and (4)
the defendant participated in the enterprise's conduct through (5) a
pattern of racketeering activity. 54 Regarding the first element, the
statute defines an enterprise as "any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group
55
of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.
Regarding the fifth element, a "pattern of racketeering activity" must
be manifested in at least two of the predicate acts enumerated in 18
U.S.C. § 1961.56 These include crimes such as murder, gambling, and
57
extortion.
The statutory elements of RICO often track modern gang
activity. A number of courts have held that gangs are "enterprises" as
defined by the statute, given that they are "ongoing organizations"
operating as "continuous units. 5 8s Whether a defendant was employed
by or associated with a gang is a relatively simple factual question.
Likewise, evidence may establish that the defendant participated in
the gang's affairs by committing one or more of the predicate acts
enumerated in the statute. It is at times more complex and
problematic, however, to establish that a gang affects interstate
commerce in a manner contemplated by the statute. When a federal
52. There are also federal statutes providing for criminal conspiracy-based-as opposed to
substantive-RICO charges, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and civil RICO claims, 18 U.S.C. § 1964. These
statutes are outside the scope of this article.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
54. United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2007).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
56. Id. § 1961(5).
57. Id. § 1961(1).
58. Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 32 (citing United States v. Connolly, 341 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir.
2003)); see also United States v. Olson, 450 F.3d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 2006) (opining that a
modicum of internal structure may make a gang an "enterprise" under RICO); United States v.
Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that gangs can be "enterprises" for
RICO purposes). Some are skeptical about equating gangs with "enterprises," however. In at
least one case, a "federal jury ... couldn't make the leap of equating a street-corner crew to a
Mafia-level criminal enterprise." Laurel J. Sweet, Danger City: DA Open to Fed Tactics, BOSTON
HERALD, Apr. 4, 2007, at 6.
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statute purports to regulate activity that "affects interstate
commerce," it thereby evinces Congress's intention to invoke its
utmost authority under the Commerce Clause. 59 Therefore, to
understand what this element requires and allows, it is necessary to
refer to the Commerce Clause 60 and the centuries of cases interpreting
it.
B. The Commerce Clause
1. Brief History of Early Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
The Commerce Clause bestows on Congress the power "[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes."6 1 The complete evolution of this
clause, from a basis to regulate ferry lines in 1824,62 to a basis to
criminalize medical marijuana in 2005,63 is a subject largely outside
the scope of this Note. However, certain aspects of that evolution are
crucial to understanding whether RICO prosecutions against
noneconomic street gangs are constitutional, and they are described
briefly in this Section.
In Gibbons v. Ogden, the first Supreme Court case dealing with
Congress's commerce power, the Court made clear that the power
Congress derives from the Commerce Clause is both substantial and
limited. 64 According to the Court, "[t]his power, like all others vested
in congress, [sic] is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in
the Constitution."65 However, according to the Court, "[t]he
enumeration presupposes something not enumerated," and the powers
not enumerated are the sovereign province of state governments. 66
Accordingly, the Court held that the commerce power did not extend
to activity confined within states' borders. 67 Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause was confined to truly interstateactivity.

59. Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 39.
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
61. Id.
62. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 2 (1824).
63. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005).
64. 22 U.S. at 193-95.
65. Id. at 196.
66. Id. at 195.
67. Id. at 194.
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The Supreme Court's analysis of the Commerce Clause evolved
significantly in response to a spate of federal regulation following the
enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.68 During this period,
the Court first held that in certain situations Congress may regulate
intrastate activities in furtherance of its commerce power. According
to the Court, "Where interstate and intrastate aspects of commerce
were so mingled together that full regulation of interstate commerce
required incidental regulation of intrastate commerce, the Commerce
Clause authorized such regulation."69 Thus, during a postreconstruction era marked by the expansion of federal laws, the Court
recognized a corresponding growth in congressional authority.
The Court further expanded Congress's ability to enact
intrastate regulation in furtherance of its national ends during the
New Deal era. 70 If intrastate activities substantially affected
interstate commerce or Congress's power over it, Congress was
permitted to regulate those intrastate activities.7 1 Furthermore,
according to the Court in Wickard v. Filburn, particular instances of
the intrastate activity being regulated did not need to have a
substantial impact on interstate commerce in order to fall within
Congress's commerce power.7 2 As long as the economic effects of the
activity were substantial when aggregated, federal regulation was
73
constitutional.
Notwithstanding this rising tide of Congress's commerce power
under Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, the Court interspersed
reminders that the power has limits. In 1937, the Court cautioned
that the commerce power must be considered in the light of the
nation's dual system of government. It may not be predicated upon
effects on interstate commerce that are so indirect or remote as to
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and
what is local and thereby create a completely centralized
74
government.
It was important to the Court, in other words, that the delicate
balance of power between national and state governments not be
disrupted. According to the Court, Congress may not "use a relatively
trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad, general regulation
68.
69.
70.
Co., 315
71.
72.
73.
74.

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1995).
Id. at 554 (citing Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)).
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy
U.S. 110, 118-19 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121-26 (1941).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555 (quoting Darby, 312 U.S. at 118).
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-29.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125, 127-28).
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
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of state or private activities." 75 In sum, as it moved into the modern
era, the Supreme Court recognized capacious congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause, but it also maintained that Congress's
authority has limits.
2. The Modern Trilogy: Lopez, Morrison & Raich
Against this precedential backdrop, three recent cases shed
further light on the constitutionality of using RICO to prosecute
violent intrastate activity of noneconomic street gangs. In United
States v. Lopez, the Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 1990, which made it a federal offense to possess a firearm within
one thousand feet of a school.7 6 The Court held that the law was an
unconstitutional extension of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause. 77 According to the Court, "[T]he proper test requires an
analysis of whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects'
interstate commerce," and it held that the statute in question "ha[d]
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise,
however broadly one might define those terms."7 8 The Court
acknowledged that firearms near schools contribute to crime, which in
turn has costly effects on the national economy.7 9 But these effects
were too attenuated to qualify as "substantial" under Commerce
Clause doctrine.8 0 In addition, the aggregation principle from Wickard
was inapplicable because, according to the Court, aggregation is only
permissible with regard to economic activity. 8 '
The Court also noted in Lopez that the statute in question dealt
with criminal law and therefore threatened to impinge on the
traditional territory of states. "Under our federal system," the Court
said, "the 'States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing
the criminal law.' "82 Allowing the federal government to enact
criminal laws on the grounds offered would shift the balance of power
between it and the States, for "[u]nder the theories that the
Government presents in support of [the Act], it is difficult to perceive
any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law
enforcement or education where States historically have been
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968)).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
Id.
Id. at 559, 561.
Id. at 563-64.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 560-61.
Id. at 561 n.3.
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sovereign."8 3 It appeared after Lopez, therefore, that the Court would
pay particular attention to questionable exercises of Congress's
commerce power when criminal law was involved, with an eye toward
preserving principles of federalism.
The Supreme Court further reined in Congress's commerce
power in United States v. Morrison, in which it struck down as
unconstitutional the Violence Against Women Act, which provided a
civil cause of action for victims of violence motivated by gender.8 4 The
violence that the act targeted was noneconomic in nature and its
individual manifestations did not by themselves have a substantial
impact on interstate commerce.8 5 The Court rejected the government's
argument that the Commerce Clause covered the legislation because,
under Wickard, the aggregate effects of such violence substantially
affected interstate commerce.86 According to the Court, the
aggregation principle was inapplicable because gender-motivated
violence was not commercial. 8 7 In sum, the Court "reject[ed] the
argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal
conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate
88
commerce."
As in Lopez, the Court in Morrison was concerned with
Congress's attempt to enter into the traditionally state-based realm of
violent crime. According to the Court, "[W]e can think of no better
example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National
Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent
crime and vindication of its victims."8 9 Striking down the Violence
Against Women Act was essential to respecting the states' police
power, for "if Congress may regulate gender-motivated violence, it
would be able to regulate murder or any other type of violence." 90
Although the Supreme Court rejected Congress's attempts to
regulate gender-motivated violence and guns near schools, the Court
subsequently held in Gonzales v. Raich that the Commerce Clause
gave Congress the power to criminalize "intrastate, noncommercial
cultivation, possession and use" of medical marijuana. 91 Raich differed
from Lopez and Morrison in that it addressed an as-applied challenge
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 564.
529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000).
Id. at 613.
Id. at 617.
Id. at 611 n.4.
Id. at 617.
Id. at 618.
Id. at 615.
545 U.S. 1, 32-33 (2005).
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to a statute, whereas Lopez and Morrison concerned challenges to the
respective statutes in their entirety. 92 The petitioners in Raich did not
argue that the Controlled
Substances
Act ("CSA")
was
unconstitutional as written, but only that it was unconstitutional as
applied to their intrastate dealings with marijuana for medicinal
purposes. 93 The Court rejected this argument, holding that even
though the petitioners' activities had a de minimis effect on interstate
commerce, those activities nevertheless could be regulated as part of a
larger regulatory effort to address a class of activity that has
substantial effects on interstate commerce-namely, dealings in
controlled substances. 94 According to the Court, "when 'a general
regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de
minimis character of individual instances arising under the statute is
of no consequence.' ,,95
Instead of focusing on the intrastate nature of the petitioners'
particular activities, the Court held that the proper level of analysis
regarded the class of activities being regulated. According to the
Court, regulating the petitioners' activity was "an essential part of the
larger regulatory scheme." 96 It was therefore acceptable that the
statute criminalized some intrastate activity. 97 The Court held that
Congress could regulate the petitioners' intrastate medical marijuana
use because that activity was part of a larger class of activitydealings in controlled substances-that Congress legitimately could
regulate.
The Court found strong similarities between Raich and
Wickard in that both involved intrastate use of fungible commodities
that, if left unregulated, would adversely affect Congress's ability to
regulate the interstate market for those commodities. 98 The
petitioner's dealings with a fungible commodity distinguished Raich
from Lopez and Morrison in that, "[u]nlike those at issue in Lopez and
Morrison, the activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially
economic." 99 The Court held that, as in Wickard, "[T]he regulation is
squarely within Congress' commerce power because production of the
commodity meant for home consumption... has a substantial effect

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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23.
15.
17-19.
17.
26-27.
22.
18-19.
25.
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on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity." 10 0
Therefore, while the class analysis in Raich constituted a new
development in Commerce Clause doctrine, the economic nature of the
activity in that case left room to distinguish it from the holdings of
Lopez and Morrison.

III. USING RICO TO PROSECUTE NONECONOMIC STREET GANGS: THE
CIRCUIT SPLIT
Within the confines of the precedents outlined above, federal
courts are called upon to decide whether RICO prosecutions against
gangs are permissible under the Commerce Clause. In many cases,
arguments that gangs affect interstate commerce are well-founded.
For example, when a gang engages in narcotics trafficking, it falls
squarely within the realm of Congress's commerce power. 10 1 Drug
dealing typically involves interstate (and even international) trade.
Even if drugs are kept intrastate, their fungible nature and the
economic character of drug dealing puts this activity within Congress's
commerce power under Raich and Wickard. In at least two cases,
however, federal prosecutors have used RICO to prosecute
noneconomic street gangs-that is, gangs that do not engage in
economic activity (such as dealing drugs, providing prostitution, or
gambling) and that operate in neighborhoods instead of in prisons or
on motorcycles.
In 1997, federal prosecutors charged a member of a Detroitarea street gang known as the Cash Flow Posse 10 2 ("CFP") with RICO
violations.10 3 The indictment alleged that the gang had waged a
campaign of violence, which included murders, murder conspiracies,
04
and attempted murders, in order to protect and acquire territory.
These alleged acts constituted the pattern of racketeering activity
required by the RICO statute. The prosecution did not allege,
however, that the gang had engaged in any economic activity, such as

100. Id. at 19.
101. See, e.g., United States v,Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 37 (1st Cir. 2007).
102. The poignancy of the gang's name in a Commerce Clause case was not lost on Judge
Cole, who wrote the opinion of the court. Waucaush v. United States, 380 F.3d 251, 253 (6th Cir.
2004) (' This case reminds us that names can be deceiving. We must determine whether, under
[RICO], the activities of a Detroit-area street gang known as the Cash Flow Posse had a
substantial effect on the nation's cash flow.").
103. Id.
104. Id.
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drug dealing. 10 5 The defendant pled guilty but later challenged his
conviction. 106
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the defendant and held that he
was actually innocent of the RICO charges because the government
did not prove that the relevant enterprise-the CFP-had engaged in
or affected interstate commerce. 107 The court held that the RICO
statute only reaches a noneconomic enterprise engaged in violent
intrastate crime if its activities substantially affect interstate
commerce. 1 08 By holding that the defendant was actually innocent, the
court avoided the conclusion that the RICO statute, as applied in
prosecutions of this sort, was unconstitutional because it surpassed
the limits of the Commerce Clause.1 0 9 In the words of the court,
"Because we should avoid interpreting a statute to prohibit conduct
which [sic] Congress may not constitutionally regulate, RICO's
meaning of 'affect[ing] interstate commerce' cannot exceed the bounds
of the Commerce Clause." 110
The Sixth Circuit elaborated on the "bounds" of the federal
commerce power. It held that the Commerce Clause would only reach
a noneconomic street gang if its activities had a substantial effect on
interstate commerce without aggregation.' 1 1 It relied on Lopez and
Morrison and held that "where the enterprise itself did not engage in
economic activity, a minimal effect on commerce will not do. 1 12
Following Morrison,the Court asserted that Congress did not have the
authority to criminalize noneconomic, violent conduct based on its
aggregate commercial effects.1 1 3 Because the CFP did not engage in
economic activity and had, at most, a de minimis effect on commerce,
the RICO statute could not reach its activities without exceeding the
bounds of the Commerce Clause.'1 4 The court argued that this holding
was consistent with sound notions of federalism.11 5 If the federal
government could regulate the CFP, there would be little left of the
states' exclusive regulatory domain.1 16

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 255-56.
Id. at 258.
Id.
Id. at 255-57.
Id. at 255.
Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 852 (2000)).
Waucaush, 380 F.3d at 255-57.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 262 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000)).
Waucaush, 380 F.3d at 257-58.
Id.
Id.
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In 2007, the First Circuit adopted a contrary stance when it
held that the Commerce Clause allows federal prosecutors to charge
noneconomic street gangs under RICO so long as the gangs have a de
minimis effect on interstate commerce. 117 The U.S. Attorney's office
brought RICO charges against a Boston-area street gang named
Ston~hurst. 118 The alleged predicate acts included murders and
assaults with intent to kill, which Stonehurst allegedly committed for
the purpose of destroying a rival gang known as Wendover. 119 The
First Circuit held that even though Stonehurst did not engage in
economic activity, it nevertheless affected interstate commerce to such
an extent as to bring the gang's activity under the umbrella of the
Commerce Clause. In particular, the court found that Stonehurst had
a de minimis impact on interstate commerce by virtue of its possession
of approximately nine firearms manufactured out of state, as well as
one firearm that a Stonehurst member had traveled out of state to
purchase. 120
According to the court, the Commerce Clause, and thus RICO,
only required a de minimis impact on interstate commerce in order to
permit federal prosecution of Stonehurst's members. 121 In reaching
this conclusion, the First Circuit relied heavily on Raich, which had
been handed down after the CFP decision. The court placed great
emphasis on Raich because, unlike Lopez and Morrison,it dealt with a
constitutional challenge to a statute as applied, rather than to the
22
statute as a whole.
Citing Raich, the First Circuit held that it was the class of
activity being regulated, not the actual activity of the particular
12 3
defendants, that was relevant to a Commerce Clause analysis.
According to the court:
All that is necessary to deflect a Commerce Clause challenge to a general regulatory
statute is a showing that the statute itself deals rationally with a class of activity that
The intrastate1 2or4
has a substantial relationship to interstate or foreign commerce ....
noneconomic character of individual instances within that class is of no consequence.

117. United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 37, 58 (2007).
118. Id. at 30. The gang was named after Stonehurst Street, its home turf. Id.
119. Id. Unlike in the CFP case, the prosecution here alleged that Stonehurst also engaged
in the economic activity of drug dealing, but the trial judge ruled the evidence on this point
insufficient as a matter of law. Id. at 30 n. 1.
120. Id. at 45.
121. Id. at 37.
122. Id. at 41.
123. Id. at 42-43.
124. Id. (citation omitted).
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The court held that, as a class, racketeering activity falls firmly within
Congress's power to regulate under the Commerce Clause. 125 And in
the court's view, noneconomic intrastate gang violence is part of this
class of activity that has the requisite substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 126 According to the court, there are "obvious ties between
organized violence and racketeering activity-the former is a frequent
concomitant of the latter." Therefore, RICO prosecutions against
noneconomic street gangs for intrastate violence are permissible under
the Commerce Clause.
Like the Sixth Circuit, the First Circuit voiced concerns about
its holding's impact on federalism. 127 Ultimately, however, it did not
deem the federalism concerns to be dispositive. 128 According to the
court, it "share[d] the appellants' concern that the government's
theory here, aggressively pursued, might threaten to trespass on an
area of traditional state concern. But though the argument has some
bite, it ultimately fails to persuade."'129 The First Circuit thus parted
ways with the Sixth and left an open question of when RICO may
constitutionally be applied to noneconomic street gangs.
IV. DRAWING THE LINE: WHY NONECOMONIC STREET GANGS MUST
HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE TO FALL
UNDER RICO
The federal government lacks authority under the Commerce
Clause to prosecute the CFP, Stonehurst, and other similar
noneconomic street gangs for their violent intrastate activity. Such
activity has a de minimis, rather than a substantial, impact on
interstate commerce. Under Lopez and Morrison, de minimis effects of
noneconomic criminal activity provide an insufficient basis for federal
regulation. 130 And while it is true that the Supreme Court expanded
its Commerce Clause analysis to "classes" of activity in Raich, the
charged activity in these cases is not in the same class as the
racketeering activity that the RICO statute addresses. Furthermore,
Raich is distinguishable because it involved a fungible commodity and

125. Id. at 43.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 41.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (rejecting "the argument
that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's
aggregate effect on interstate commerce").
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statute. 131 These prosecutions
a "quintessentially economic"
impermissibly alter the balance between state and federal
sovereignty. Accordingly, courts should only allow RICO prosecutions
against noneconomic street gangs if the gangs have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.
A. The Effects of Noneconomic Street Gangs on Interstate Commerce
Neither the CFP nor Stonehurst substantially affected
interstate commerce; their effects were de minimis. In the CFP
prosecution, the government alleged that affiliates of the gang sold an
unknown quantity of narcotics in Illinois at an unknown time. 132 The
Sixth Circuit found this insufficient to establish a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. 13 3 The court acknowledged that the CFP's
alleged violence necessarily had some de minimis effect on interstate
commerce, because "a corpse cannot show, after all."'134 Nevertheless,
the effect was too attenuated to be "substantial" under Commerce
Clause doctrine. 35 In the Stonehurst prosecution, the government
alleged that the gang affected interstate commerce by (1) committing
violence in a tire shop, which caused the shop to stay closed for several
work hours; (2) using cellular phones; (3) possessing approximately
nine weapons manufactured out of state; and (4) having as a member
an individual who purchased a firearm out of state to use in
Massachusetts. 36 The court held that this activity had a de minimis,
rather than substantial, effect on interstate commerce.
Under Lopez and Morrison, these de minimis effects would not
be enough to permit federal regulation of noneconomic activity.
According to the Court in Lopez, "the proper test requires an analysis
of whether the regulated activity substantially affects interstate
commerce."' 37 Furthermore, effects of this sort cannot be aggregated
for Commerce Clause analysis, because the Morrison Court "reject[ed]
the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent
criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on
interstate commerce."' 138 Based on Lopez and Morrison, therefore, the
activity engaged in by Stonehurst, the CFP, and other similarly
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005).
Waucaush v. United States, 380 F.3d 251, 256-58 (2004).
Id.
Id. at 258.
Id.
United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 43-45 (1st Cir. 2007).
United States v. Lopez, 519 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000).
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situated noneconomic street gangs does not have an effect on
interstate commerce sufficient to permit federal prosecution.
B. Class Analysis of Noneconomic Street Gangs Under Raich
The class-based approach to Commerce Clause analysis under
Raich does not lead to the conclusion that noneconomic street gangs
may be prosecuted by the federal government given a de minimis
effect on interstate commerce, notwithstanding the First Circuit's
holding in the Stonehurst case. In Raich, the Supreme Court held that
when a "class of activities is regulated and the class is within the
reach of federal power, the courts have no power to excise, as trivial,
individual instances of the class."'139 Following Raich, the First Circuit
held that the violent intrastate activities of noneconomic street gangs
were part of a class of activity that had the requisite effect on
interstate commerce to bring them within the ambit of the Commerce
Clause. 140 Therefore, the de minimis nature of the gangs' economic
41
effects on interstate commerce was of no consequence.'
Contrary to the First Circuit's holding, however, the
defendants' activities in the subject prosecutions are not in the same
class of activity that RICO legitimately regulates. When describing
the class of activity that RICO regulates, the First Circuit noted that
"[p]articular manifestations include loan-sharking, extortion, and a
host of other financially driven crimes."' 42 But the predicate acts with
which CFP and Stonehurst members were charged differ entirely from
those enumerated. Crucially, none of the alleged predicate acts
involved economic activity or were "financially driven."
To support the supposed class identity, the First Circuit argued
that regulating noneconomic street gang activity was an essential part
of the government's larger regulatory scheme. 143 According to the
court, "Given the obvious ties between organized violence and
racketeering activity-the former is a frequent concomitant of the
latter-we defer to Congress's rational judgment, as part of its effort
to crack down on racketeering enterprises, to enact a statute that
targeted organized violence."'144 This argument proves too much. Even
if the relevant activities are "frequent concomitant [s]," that does not
139. Id. (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
140. Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 40-43.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 43.
143. Id.

144. Id.
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prove that regulating one is an essential or appropriate means for
regulating the other. Indeed, by that rationale the federal government
could regulate any number of traditional state crimes. For instance,
truancy "is a frequent concomitant" of teenage drug dealing. Surely it
would not be permissible for Congress to criminalize truancy as part of
its war on drugs.
In Raich, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
marijuana-related activity in that case constituted a class of activity
14 5
distinct from the activity appropriately regulated by the CSA.
Despite failing in Raich, however, the argument should prevail in
cases of this sort. The CSA includes marijuana without exempting
private medicinal use. RICO, on the other hand, says nothing of
noneconomic intrastate gang activity. It speaks to enterprise activities
that affect interstate commerce. This invokes the full power of the
Commerce Clause, 146 but it also invokes the corresponding doctrinal
requirement that noneconomic activity substantially affect interstate
147
commerce without aggregation.
It is far more plausible to argue that the private intrastate use
of marijuana is an individual component of the marijuana trade than
to argue that noneconomic gangs are an individual component of the
insidious racketeering that RICO was meant to address. The use of
marijuana-a commodity-actually is a part of commerce. Privately
cultivated marijuana may affect the availability of and demand for
marijuana generally in interstate commerce. 4 Therefore, in Raich,
there was a concrete connection between the activity being prosecuted
and the government's regulatory focus. As the Supreme Court noted,
there was reason to believe that "failure to regulate the intrastate
manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in
the CSA."'149 No such relationship is apparent in this case. The lack of
federal regulation of noneconomic intrastate gang activity does not
affect economically driven interstate criminal enterprises or the
government's ability to regulate them, let alone leave a "gaping hole"
in the federal government's regulatory capacity. In fact, were the
federal government to leave prosecution of noneconomic violent acts to

145. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 28 (2005).
146. See, e.g., Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 39 ("[Statutes regulating undescribed activities that
'affect' interstate commerce perforce must reach all activities that come within Congress's
power.").
147. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000).
148. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801(4) (2000) ("Local distribution and possession
of controlled substances contribute to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances.").
149. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.
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the states, it would have more resources with which it could pursue
prosecutions of illegal enterprises on a national scale.
C. DistinguishingRaich: The Effects of Fungible Commodities
The Raich class analysis may not even be applicable to cases
questioning the constitutionality of RICO prosecutions of noneconomic
street gangs. A crucial distinguishing factor between Raich and the
subject prosecutions is the presence in Raich of a fungible
commodity-marijuana. The fact that marijuana is a commodity was a
clear factor in the Supreme Court's determination that partial
decriminalization would have a powerful effect on interstate
commerce. As the Court noted:
One need not have a degree in economics to understand why a nationwide exemption for
the vast quantity of marijuana (or other drugs) locally cultivated for personal use (which
presumably would include use by friends, neighbors, and family members) may have a
substantial impact on the interstate market for this extraordinarily popular
1 50
substance.

In the Stonehurst case, the First Circuit downplayed the
influence that fungible commodities have on the Supreme Court's
analysis. In its own words, the First Circuit "refuse[d] to accord
decretory significance to a distinction that the majority in Raich did
not deem decisive." 151 This gives unduly short shrift to the impact that
the presence of a commodity had in Raich. In fact, the Court relied on
the observation that marijuana was a commodity to distinguish Raich
from the leading precedents of Morrison and Lopez and liken it
instead to Wickard.152 It noted that, "[u]nlike those at issue in Lopez
and Morrison, the activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially
economic."'1 5 3 Accordingly, "the regulation is squarely within Congress'
[sic] commerce power because production of the commodity meant for
home consumption.., has a substantial effect on supply and demand
154
in the national market for that commodity."'
The presence of this distinguishing factor suggests that Lopez
and Morrison still offer more suitable guidance for cases involving the
prosecution of noneconomic street gangs. In Morrison, the Court
admonished that "[b]oth petitioners and Justice Souter's dissent
downplay the role that the economic nature of the regulated activity
plays in our Commerce Clause analysis. But a fair reading of Lopez
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 28.
Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 42.
Raich, 545 U.S. at 18-25.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 19.
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shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue
was central to our decision in that case. ' 155 The same criticism could
be leveled against the First Circuit's opinion in the Stonehurst casethat it downplayed the importance of the noneconomic, criminal
nature of the conduct at issue. Given this noneconomic, criminal
nature, courts dealing with this issue would be well-served to
distinguish Raich and follow Lopez and Morrison by concluding that
prosecutions of this sort are beyond the federal government's
commerce power.
D. Federalism, CriminalLaw, and the Commerce Clause
Not only do RICO prosecutions of noneconomic street gangs not
sit well within Commerce Clause doctrine, but they also threaten to
disrupt the balance of power between the federal and state
governments. From the founding until the present day, United States
citizens have been assured that the powers of the federal government
shall be substantially held in check in favor of the plenary police
powers of the state. Madison wrote in Federalist No. 45 that "[tihe
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which [sic] are to remain in
the State governments are numerous and infinite. '156 Over two
centuries later, the Supreme Court reiterated in Morrison that "[t]he
Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local."1 57 Federal prosecution of noneconomic street
gangs blurs that line. It takes traditionally state-regulated crimes
such as murder and assault and transforms them into matters of
federal law.
In its cases interpreting the Commerce Clause, the Supreme
Court consistently has espoused its commitment to maintaining the
delicate balance of power between the two forms of government. For
instance, in Lopez the Court acknowledged its "fear that [if it upheld
the Gun-Free School Zones Act] there would be virtually no limit to
the federal power and for all practical purposes we should have a
1 58
completely centralized government."
Respect for the role of state government has been particularly
pronounced with regard to criminal law. As the Lopez Court noted,
155. United States v. Morrison 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 551 (1995)).
156. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison).

157. Morrison,529 U.S. at 617-18.
158. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555 (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 548 (1935)).
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"the States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the
criminal law,"159 and "in areas such as criminal law ... States
historically have been sovereign." 160 In United States v. Jones, the
161
Court noted that "arson is a paradigmatic common-law state crime."
The same can be said about murder, attempted murder, and the other
violent crimes with which CFP and Stonehurst members were
charged.
Of course, the CSA is a criminal statute, and its application to
intrastate marijuana in Raich withstood Commerce Clause analysis.
The regulation of marijuana is different in nature, however, from the
prosecution of age-old violent crimes. As noted above, drugs are a
commodity. Therefore, they have a natural connection to national
economics and interstate commerce. In contrast, violent crimes
committed for territorial control are not economic. Only through a
nuanced class analysis can courts even attempt to escape the
conclusion that RICO prosecutions against noneconomic street gangs
infringe on state sovereignty.
The Sixth Circuit emphasized the threat to the balance of
power that these federal prosecutions pose. It held that "[a]llowing the
government to meet the interstate commerce requirement [in a federal
criminal prosecution] through only a nominal showing of a connection
to interstate commerce would do as much to completely obliterate the
distinction between national and local authority as if no jurisdictional
requirement existed at all." 162 The First Circuit also recognized this
threat when it said that it "share[d] the appellants' concern that the
government's theory here, aggressively pursued, might threaten to
trespass on an area of traditional state concern."1 63 That court
nevertheless affirmed the Stonehurst conviction, in part because it
was "confident that political checks and balances will prevent any
1 64
such legislative overreaching."'
It is far from clear, however, that "political checks and
balances" will adequately rein in federal law enforcement in this area.
Congress is unlikely to check the executive branch. Being "tough on
crime" is a veritable prerequisite for modern political candidacy. In
the same vein, it may be undesirable for a member of Congress to
explain to her constituents that Congress is rolling back federal
159. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)
(quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. Id. at 564.
161. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000).
162. Waucaush v. United States, 380 U.S. 251, 257-58 (2004) (internal citation omitted).
163. United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 41 (2007).
164. Id.
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prosecution of gangs because it runs afoul of time-honored concerns of
federalism and the Commerce Clause. In reality, using RICO to
combat gangs has proven popular in Washington. 165 Contrary to the
First Circuit's claim, the courts are charged with guarding the fringes
of constitutionally delegated powers in this area.
E. Statutory Construction
On the basis of principles of statutory construction, the First
Circuit objected to the conclusion that noneconomic street gangs must
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce to fall under the
umbrella of the Commerce Clause and RICO. According to the court:
This argument is peculiar. Although nothing in the text of RICO suggests it, the
[argument] urge[s] us to read a single phrase in the statute as requiring different things
in different situations: in a case involving an enterprise engaged in economic activity,
the government would have to show only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce,
whereas in a case involving an enterprise engaged in violence but not in economic
activity, the government would have to show a more substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 166

The court argued that giving dual meanings to a single term conflicts
with the Supreme Court's holding in Clark v. Martinez, which "made
it clear that the doctrine does not serve to give alternative meanings
to statutory phrases in cases in which a statute's application might be
'167
constitutionally dubious.
Even if courts must ascribe a single meaning to the statutory
phrase "affects," however, surely the appropriate response is not to
suffer a "constitutionally dubious" construction in the name of
interpretive consistency, but rather to jettison the dubious
construction in favor of a consistent, constitutionally sound doctrine.
One possibility is to require that any activity being regulated under
RICO-economic or noneconomic-have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. This reformulation need not overturn precedents
so much as recast them. The so-called "de minimis effects" of economic
activity previously regulated under RICO can be recast as substantial
effects. For example, the drug dealer who never leaves his
neighborhood, the gardener raising wheat, and the cancer patient
growing marijuana all have substantial effects on interstate
commerce. Even though the interstate effects of their activities are
small, they are economic in nature and so are necessarily substantial.
The same cannot be said for the de minimis effects of noneconomic
165. See supra Part II.A.
166. Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 37.
167. Id. at 38 (citing Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 384 (2004)).
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activity. Noneconomic activities do not have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce in any sense.
V. CONCLUSION

The federal government is escalating its campaign against
gangs and is using the RICO statute as one of its primary weapons.
While these federal prosecutions seem in many cases to be on firm
footing-both in terms of statutory and constitutional requirementsthere is a subset of cases that is worthy of concern. Federal
prosecutions of noneconomic street gangs with de minimis effects on
interstate commerce exceed the bounds of the federal government's
authority under the Commerce Clause. In addition to running afoul of
Supreme Court doctrine, these prosecutions also run the danger of
altering the fragile balance of power between the state and federal
governments that the Constitution requires. Courts should require
that RICO prosecutions against noneconomic street gangs only
proceed against gangs that have had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
Figure 1. RICO Gang Prosecutions Reported Since 2000

Location
Los Angeles, CA
Santa Rosa, CA
Los Angeles, CA
Salt Lake City, UT
North Las Vegas, NV
Syracuse, NY
Salt Lake City, UT

Gang
18th Street Gang
Nuestra Familia
Aryan Brotherhood
King Mafia Associates
Crips
Boot Camp Gang
Soldiers of the Aryan Culture

Year (Indictment
and/or
Disposition)
2000168

2001169
2002170
2002171
2003172
2003173
2003174

168. Final Defendant Charged in 2000 RICO Indictment of 18th Street Gang Arrested in
IndianaAfter Six Years as Fugitive, U.S. FED. NEWS, 2007 WLNR 4166421, Jan. 19, 2007.
169. Maria L. La Ganga, 13 Indicted in Violence Led by Prison Gang, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24,
2001, at A3.
170. Life Imprisonment for Two More Aryan Brotherhood Members, U.S. FED. NEWS, 2007
WLNR 17795478, Sept. 10, 2007.
171. Hurst Laviana, RICO Law Has Helped Some Cities Curb Gangs, WICHITA EAGLE (Kan.),
Oct. 7, 2007, at B1.
172. Hammer: RICO A Strong Weapon Against Gangs, WICHITA EAGLE (Kan.), Oct. 2, 2007,
at A2.
173. Laviana, supra note 171.
174. Id.
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Location

Gang

Year (Indictment
and/or
Disposition)

Boston, MA

Stonehurst Gang

2004175

Las Vegas, NV

Hells Angels

2005176

Santa Ana, CA
Syracuse, NY

West Myrtle Street Gang; Mexican Mafia
Elk Block Gang

2005177

Tulsa, OK

Hoover Crips

2005179

Albany, NY
Atlanta, GA
Los Angeles, CA

Jungle Junkies
Brownside Locos
Vineland Boys

2006180
2006181

Salt Lake City, UT
San Diego, CA

Tiny Oriental Posse
Mexican Mafia

2006113

Spokane, WA

Hells Angels

2006185

Syracuse, NY

Brighton Brigade

2006186

Tampa, FL

Latin Kings

2006187

Atlanta, GA

SUR-13

2007188

Dallas, TX
Houston, TX

Texas Syndicate
Texas Syndicate

2007189
2007190

2005178

2006182

2006184

175. Eric T. Berkman, RICO Covers Violent, Noneconomic Activity, Rules 1st Circuit, MASS.
LAW. WKLY., July 16, 2007.
176. Bill Borlin, Hells Angels President Sentenced to 90 Months, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW
(Spokane, Wash.), Sept. 18, 2007; David Bowermaster, Jury Convicts 3 of 4 in Hells Angels Case,
SEATTLE TIMES, June 12, 2007.
177. H.G. Reza, RICO Target in Santa Ana Is Convicted, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2007, at A2.
178. Id.
179. Laviana, supra note 171.
180. Id.
181. Final Members of "BrownsideLocos" Street Gang Sentenced in Federal RICO Case, U.S.
FED. NEWS, 2007 WLNR 7877389, Jan. 12, 2007.
182. Andrew Glazer, Mob Mentality Used Against Gangs, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 19, 2006,
at A8.
183. Laviana, supra note 171.
184. FBI Seeks Gang Fugitive, U.S. FED. NEWS, 2007 WLNR 17053939, Aug. 17, 2007.
185. Supra note 176.
186. Id.
187. Thomas W. Krause, 2 in Raid: No Longer Face RICO Charges, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 31,
2007, at 2.
188. Five Members of "Sur-13" Gang Convicted, U.S. FED. NEWS, 2007 WLNR 17644188,
Sept. 6, 2007.

189. Jason Trahan, 14 Members of Prison Gang Indicted in Racketeering Case: Dallas Feds
Say They're Responsible for 12 Deaths, Drug Trafficking, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 10, 2007,
at 3B.

190. Anti-Gang Effort Leads to RICO Indictment of Seventeen Alleged Members or Associates
of Texas Syndicate Prison Gang, U.S. FED. NEWS, 2007 WLNR 2961669, Feb. 12, 2007.

238

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

Location
Los Angeles, CA
McAllen, TX
Nashville, TN
Newark, NJ
Northern Virginia
Prince George's County, MD
Wichita, KS

Gang
Florencia 13
Texas Syndicate
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Year (Indictment
and/or
Disposition)
2007191
2007192

MS-13
Double IIBloods
Dragon Family

2007193

MS-13
Crips

2007196

2007194
2007195
2007197

Matthew Hardwick Blumenstein*

191. Jerry Seper, Drug Agents Arrest 34 in L.A., WASH. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007, at A9.
192. Nine Alleged Members, Associates of Texas Syndicate Prison Gang Indicted for Violating
RICO Statute, U.S. FED. NEWS, 2007 WLNR 9091644, Apr. 3, 2007.
193. Thirteen Alleged Members of MS-13 Gang Indicted on Racketeering Conspiracy Charges,
U.S. FED. NEWS, 2007 WLNR 570204, Jan. 10, 2007.
194. Acting Deputy Attorney General Morford Announces 2007 Project Safe Neighborhoods
Achievement Awards Recipients at National Conference, U.S. FED. NEWS, 2007 WLNR 20653136,
Sept. 17, 2007.
195. Gang Member Pleads Guilty to RICO Conspiracy, Two Murders, U.S. FED. NEWS, 2007
WLNR 17647388, Sept. 4, 2007.
196. Id.
197. Federal Racketeering Charges Filed Against Crips Gang Members in Wichita, U.S. FED.
NEWS, 2007 WLNR 19326114, Oct. 1, 2007.
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